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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, the question of whether there is a difference in voter participation 
between partisan and nonpartisan ballots in municipal elections is addressed. This 
study will employ statistical regression to isolate and measure voter turnout in these 
two scenarios. Reforms which began in the late nineteenth century continue to have an 
impact on our daily lives. The Progressive Era, which championed much social 
equality for our country, has an oft overlooked darker side whose influences and 
consequences remain. Specifically, the municipal reforms of the early twentieth 
century. Much of the research on the topic of municipal elections has included 
nonpartisan ballots, as they are included in what are known as reform cities along with 
manager governments and at-large elections, to name a few. Research on nonpartisan 
elections and turnout has yielded support for the notion that the implementation of 
municipal reform has served to depress civic participation. However, there is not yet a 
study looking solely at these variables.  
The research design for this study is non-experimental. A random effects generalized 
least squares regression with robust standard error adjusted for clustering of 
municipalities over time was employed to test for an effect on voter turnout based on 
the type of municipal ballot, partisan or non-partisan. The dependent variable is voter 
turnout and is a quantitative variable. The independent variable is a categorical 
qualitative variable which is defined by the presence or absent of party label on 
municipal ballots. This paper addressed this deficit using Rhode Island as a case study, 
as nine of the 39 municipalities are nonpartisan. Comparing turnout over five 
 
 
elections, the results of this study will hopefully provide strong evidence about the 
impact of nonpartisan ballots in local elections and aid in the overall discussion.
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The Legitimate Consequences of Form of Government and Nonpartisan Ballots 
in Municipal Elections 
INTRODUCTION 
This study endeavors to evaluate the impact of various municipal structures on voter 
participation. Specifically how two structures, ballot type and form of government, 
effect voter registration and voter turnout in Rhode Island. My interest in studying the 
topic of local elections occurred while I was in my second year as a Political Science 
graduate student and after I had run my husband’s city council campaign in Newport, 
RI. Having been drawn to Political Science because of my interest in social science, 
human behavior, and politics and my professional work experience in the political 
world, I was already an enthusiast of American Politics at the national and state levels. 
Before running my husband’s city council campaign, I had a number of assumptions 
about local politics. Since I was working for a Republican in a heavily Democratic 
city, let alone state, I thought that the absence of party labels in a nonpartisan contest 
would be beneficial for the candidate. One of the problems with this assumption about 
nonpartisan municipal elections was that I concurrently assumed that the residents 
would be politically and civically engaged. My experience and my scholarship led me 
to reevaluate this and other thoughts about parties, partisanship, and other structural 
aspects in local elections.    
Through the course of my graduate program, I came across a 1952 article by Charles 
Adrian titled, “General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections.” His observations 
were such an accurate reflection of my experience in a nonpartisan municipality that I 
felt the paper could have been written specifically about Newport present day.  The 
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year of Adrian’s paper is the same year that the nonpartisan ballot, as well as other 
Progressive reforms, was implemented in Newport. Adrian’s register of general 
characteristics consists of eleven items, many of which have been assessed, questioned 
and built upon over the past 60 years. The resonance this particular paper held for me 
led me to pursue research on nonpartisan municipal elections. Further research on the 
origins of nonpartisan elections and Progressive Era reforms led to an expanded scope 
including municipal forms of government.   
NYU political science professor, Costas Panagopoulos, in an editorial on nonpartisan 
municipal elections, stated “This is one debate the discipline has missed the boat on.... 
At best, political science data on the matter is scarce, outdated, and inconclusive” 
(Panagopoulos 2003). There have been a variety of studies about the impact of 
nonpartisan ballots on municipal elections and the impact of different forms of 
municipal government structures (Alford and Lee 1968, Bridges 1997, Caren 2007, S. 
P. Hays 1964, Hajnal and Lewis 2003, Karnig and Walter 1983, Lee 1960, Schaffner, 
Streb and Wright 2001, Welch and Bledsoe 1986, C. Wood 2002).  To date, there have 
been comparative quantitative analyses between comparable municipalities but there 
has not been an empirical test of the effect of these municipal structures on voter 
participation within an entire state. This paper seeks to address Panagopoulos’ point 
by utilizing the necessary, recent, and relevant data towards a more conclusive end. 
The issue of voter participation is one which ties together threads throughout our 
history as a democracy, from our country’s founding, through the evolution of our 
government, up to our current political system. The United States did not realize full 
voter suffrage until the ratification of the 19th amendment in 1920 granting women the 
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right to vote. Currently, voting rights is a subject being disputed and decided in 
municipalities, states, and even the Supreme Court. As will be examined in this study, 
parties and government structures impact voter participation. Voter participation is a 
crucial component of representation, a keystone of our conception of democracy.  
From the inception of this experiment in democracy, the founders were wary of 
political parties. In his farewell address, George Washington warned against political 
parties casting them as potential impediments to the efficacy and permanency of the 
country as a whole. The fear was that if the populace segregated itself into factions or 
parties, this division would lead to instability and potentially the demise of the entire 
union. In Federalist 10, James Madison acknowledged the tendency for man to fall 
into factions or groups of interest. With this recognition of human behavior, he 
decided not to support prohibition of the inevitable but to create a series of mediating 
forces, ultimately through federalism, to impede the negative effects of such groups. In 
so doing, however, the structures and impediments the founders put in place ultimately 
set the course for modern political parties (Aldrich 1995). E. E. Schattschneider keenly 
notes that the founders clearly did not anticipate the real prospect of political parties, 
as we know them, as evidenced by “the provision in the original Constitution that the 
House choose a president from five candidates receiving the highest electoral vote” 
(Schattschneider 2009, 51). Similar distaste and mistrust of political parties, albeit due 
to real not theoretical concerns, was a driving force by reformers in the Progressive 
Era.  
Another aspect of representation which was present amongst the founders and 
reformers is an elitist view of who exactly should govern. Both felt that the well-
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educated should represent the rest of the population. As will be discussed in a later 
section, reformers in the Progressive Era implemented mediating forces, or structures, 
in an effort to bring about that outcome.  
In the following sections, I will present the historical context of the Progressive Era, 
including how and why reformers were spurred to action and the actions they took, 
specifically in municipal reform. The introduction of nonpartisan ballots, the Council-
Manager form of government, and other municipal reforms will be discussed. This is 
followed by an assessment of the implications and consequences of these reforms. A 
review of the extant literature on participation will lay the groundwork for the data and 
methods used to test the stated hypotheses. After the finding and results of the 
analyses are presented, the paper will close with a discussion of said findings and their 
implications and relevance.  
WHY RHODE ISLAND? 
As a graduate student at the University of Rhode Island, primarily interested in 
American politics at the state and local levels, Rhode Island was an obvious choice to 
study. But there are other reasons which inspired my selection. One was my 
experience living in Newport while pursuing my degree. Another was the size of the 
state and its 39 cities and towns. While there have been studies evaluating the 
relationship between non-partisan elections and participation, there has not been one 
which studies an entire state in this manner. Accordingly, the relative scale of data 
collection was manageable. Thankfully, Rhode Island’s Secretary of State provides 
easily accessible elections results. Additionally, there was a large enough sample of 
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non-partisan municipalities for statistical analysis. Twenty-three percent of the state’s 
municipalities elect their local officials without party designation on the ballot. 
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HISTORICAL SETTING: Progressive Era 
If one took but a cursory review of the Progressive Era, perhaps in textbooks or online, 
one would read about good government reformers working in the public interest and 
against corruption (Buhle, et al., 2000, Glencoe McGraw-Hill, 2009). While this 
assessment is not necessarily incorrect, it is hardly the whole story (Judd and 
Swanstrom 2004, p. 75). The Progressive Era, or the Progressive Movement, came 
about in response to the growing pains of a young nation which was in the midst of 
rapid industrial and population expansion (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Schiesl 1977). 
This paper focuses on local and municipal elections, whose present day structures 
were in large part constructed during the Progressive Era. To understand current forms 
of government and elections, I will first review how these reforms. The following 
section reviews the history of the Progressive Era, focusing primarily on changes to 
local governance, and sets the stage for present day municipal government and 
elections.  
The Progressive Era took place roughly between 1880 and 1930 (Hofstadte, 1955, 
Morgan, et al., 2007, Welch and Bledsoe 1988). At the national and federal level, 
there were calls for reform of industry and for protection of workers. Charles Beard, a 
prominent scholar and pro-reform advocate, described the Progressive Era by saying, 
“The country was then in the midst of a periodic depression. Strikes and unrest were 
abroad in the land. By leaps and bounds cities had been growing in population, wealth, 
poverty, slums and degradation. During the preceding years scandals and frauds in 
national, state and local government had been unearthed in shocking forms” (National 
Civic League 2009).  As a result, there was a populist thread to the national 
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Progressive Movement which called for a more equal playing field between businesses 
and workers as well as for civil service reforms which would make government 
employment more merit based. Leagues and associations sprung up to tackle such 
issues, including the Civil Service Reform Association and the Massachusetts Reform 
Club.  
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THE PROGRESIVE MOVEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTY MACHINES 
The changes in population and the influx of immigrants experienced during the late 
1800s were felt acutely in the cities and urban areas. In the 1880s New York City’s 
population increased by 75 percent from 171,750 to 3 million, Philadelphia’s 
population topped one million, and Midwestern cities such as Cleveland and Chicago 
doubled their populations (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Schiesl 1977, Wood 1958, p. 
34). These surges in population left cities with more people than they were prepared to 
manage: in short, populations soared faster than city planners could plan for them. The 
lack of infrastructure and systems for delivering services by the local government left 
a vacuum which was eagerly, and sometimes effectively, filled by local partisans. 
Seizing the opportunity, the local parties grew and took advantage of their position in 
the community (Hofstadter 1955). According to Welch and Bledsoe (1988, p.2), “the 
turn-of-the-century political machines were led and backed by members of the lower 
class and the working class, most of whom were of immigrant background.” Leading 
the machines were the party bosses who used a system of patronage and wielded 
power over many jobs in city government. Tammany Hall and Boss Tweed are 
infamous examples of the party machine and ward boss systems (Riordan and Quinn 
1995). The system of “spoils,”1 while serving some benefit to their communities, was 
not without its significant downsides. Corruption, waste, and a lack of improvement in 
living conditions were hallmarks of these parties.  
                                                             
1 Spoils, in this context, can be defined to mean “booty, loot, or plunder taken in war or robbery,” or 
“the emoluments and advantages of public office viewed as won by a victorious political party: the 
spoils of office.” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/spoils 
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The old guards of the cities, the Brahman and Anglo-Protestant classes, were unnerved 
by these rapid changes in their communities. Specifically, they were alarmed by their 
loss of political power to the machines and party bosses. While they were aware of the 
need of administrative structures to handle the needs of the community, they were 
keenly aware of the potential for loss of status and command. The main stated goal of 
reform was to eliminate corruption, waste, and inefficiency (Banfield and Wilson 
1963, p. 138, Morgan, et al., 2007, p. 63), which reformers saw manifested in corrupt 
party officials and partisan patronage. The main source of such excess was the party 
machine and it thereby became the direct target of the reformers’ ire.  
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REFORMERS 
The tumultuous situations in the growing urban areas eventually became untenable for 
many and calls for reform of the municipal system increased. Many of those who went 
on to be reformers hailed from the middle and upper class, who had previously held 
power in local government (Frederickson, Johnson and Wood 2004, 36). Melvin G. 
Holli identified two main types of reformers, social and structural (Hawley 1973, 
Welch and Bledsoe 1988). While both were distressed by the state of affairs, social 
reformers were also interested in the well-being of the less fortunate and the overall 
welfare of the general populace. Structural reformers were more concerned with 
returning their cities to a pre-immigrant era and the associated benefits like lower 
taxes (Morgan, England and Pelissero 2007, 64).  
Municipal reformers were united by the belief that the political machines were the 
primary root of the present day evils. A logical antithesis of corruption and waste is 
efficiency. Early on in the reform movement, efficiency was synonymous with good 
government (Judd and Swanstrom 2004).  The drive for efficiency was tied to a desire 
to lower the cost of running a city, including lowering taxes. Therefore the more 
efficient a government, the better it was. In the same vein, reformers argued that a 
municipality was a corporation, as opposed to a political entity, with citizens as 
shareholders. A new system or structure of governance was sought to take the politics 
and waste out of city government (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Schiesl 1977).  The 
practicality and efficiency of a business model was a hallmark of the reformers 
argument (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Hays 1964, Holli 1974, Judd and Swanstrom 
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2004, Link 1959, McCormick 1981, Morgan, et al., 2007, Schiesl 1977, Weinstein 
1962, Welch and Bledsoe 1988). 
Another important component of the reformers position was their ideology, which 
included a firm belief in their purpose because it was good and moral. Righteously 
sure, reformers declared their new structure of municipal government to be “more 
moral, more rational, and more efficient and, because it was so, self-evidently more 
desirable” (Hays 1964, p. 157). Elitism was included in this moral superiority, 
stemming from discord and discomfort between the WASP reformers and growing 
immigrant population. A natural next step from this combination of ideological zeal, 
elitism, and business principles, was the “pervasive belief that certain citizens – 
professionals, experts, and the well-educated – were more fit to govern than others” 
(Hawley 1973, 9).  
Municipal leagues sprung up in cities and states to tackle the municipal problems of 
the day (Holli 1974, Tolman and Parkhurst 1895). The National Municipal League, 
which was founded in 1894, was “primarily concerned with structural, not social, 
reform, promoted ‘good government’ practices of various kinds and provided a 
network for local reform groups” (Welch and Bledsoe 1988). Membership in the 
League was largely made up of local businessmen and upper-middle class 
professionals (Hawley 1973, Link 1959, Schiesl 1977). These businessmen and 
members of the upper and middle class understood the opportunities available to them 
in reforming the local government. It was logical for them to support good 
government reforms which would increase access of government services and benefit 
their personal financial interests (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Hays 1964, Link 1959). 
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MUNICIPAL REFORM 
At the local level, reforms were promoted to make government more efficient, more 
accessible and more representative. Richard Childs, thought of as the founder of 
council-manager government, conceived of and convincingly argued for the new 
government structure. His plan was “patterned after a business model of an 
organization” (East 1965, p. 36). Eventually, “progressivism, scientific management 
and public administration had accepted the model of the private business corporation 
as the form most likely to produce that prized commodity, efficiency” (East 1965, p. 
74). Childs’ work was and still is used by organizations promoting municipal reform. 
In the late 1890s, the National Municipal League was founded to advocate for 
municipal reform and is still in operation today as the National Civic League. In 1898, 
the League adopted its first Municipal Plan which included a provision known as a 
“home rule charter” to “give more power and autonomy to local officials, a unicameral 
city council with nonpartisan elections, and a hands-on managerial mayor to appoint 
and remove department heads” (McGrath 2011). In 2003, the League published its 
eighth edition of the Model City Charter and continues to promote many of the same 
reforms and platforms as earlier editions, including nonpartisan elections.  
James Bryce, and his 1888 The American Commonwealth, laid the groundwork for the 
structural reform that would take place over the following decades (Holli 1974). 
Bryce’s outline discusses corrupt officials, problems with local partisanship, the 
intervention of state government in local affairs, and “mechanical defects” in the 
structure of local government. Banfield and Wilson argue that the “program of 
reform” is best viewed in four categories or objectives. These objectives include: 1. 
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“putting the electorate in the position to assert its will despite professional politicians,” 
which encompasses the initiative, recall and referendum; 2. “simplifying the voter’s 
task” with the use of a short ballot and information provided by municipal 
associations; 3. “checking the tide of immigration,” which speaks to the contrast 
between the demographics of the reformers and immigrant populations; 4. “separating 
the ‘business’ of city government from state and national politics” by implementing 
home rule, nonpartisanship, and timing local elections apart from state and national 
ones (Banfield and Wilson 1963, 140-141).  
To the reformers, party machines and bosses were the embodiment of the problem 
belying the cities (Bridges 1997). Thus, the focus of reform originated with removing 
the parties from power. Call for nonpartisanship began as early as 1881 (Hawley 1973, 
Holl, 1974, Lee 1960, Morgan, et al., 2007, Schies, 1977, Welch and Bledsoe 1988). 
By removing the partisan influence, the reformers could remove the bad actors and 
make room for those who they saw as more fit to govern.  
To tackle corrupt officials, reformers were in favor of merit based placement for 
government jobs. This was part of civil service reform which was a concurrent 
movement at both the local and national levels. The removal of party loyalty and 
patronage blended well with the argument for merit based placement in the 
government (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Holli 1974). In response to the relationship 
between the state legislature and municipal government, Home Rule set the legal basis 
for local autonomy for a city or municipality within its home state (Vanlandingham 
1968, 270). To remedy the perceived decline in representation of the reformers in local 
government, at-large elections were endorsed over ward elections (Banfield and 
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Wilson 1963, Hays 1967, Judd and Swanstrom 2004, Morgan, et al., 2007, Welch and 
Bledsoe 1988). Armed with these and other prescriptions for taking the politics out of 
local government, the National Municipal League published its first Model City 
Charter in 1899 (Gates and Loper 2003).  
Charter revision was already underway in Galveston, TX by 1899. Four years earlier, 
a Good Government club had been formed by local businessmen. In 1900, the 
opportunity for a new form of government presented itself when a devastating 
hurricane and tidal wave all but destroyed the city (National Civic League 2009, 
Schiesl 1977). Unable to properly supervise the resulting circumstance, the sitting 
council resigned and a commission of, primarily, businessmen took up the mantle of 
governing the city. After some legal fine-tuning with the state legislature, a legitimate 
Commission plan was officially in place. Part of the appeal was that a city could 
function as an administrative entity without conflict of interest (Schiesl 1977, 136). 
The new system of government spread quickly, gaining notoriety as the Des Moines 
Plan in 1907, and was implemented in 300 cities by 1913 (Weinstein 1962, 169).  
Unfortunately, the Des Moines Plan proved problematic in practice. The main issue 
was the combination of legislative and executive functions into one body. Efficiency 
suffered (Schiesl 1977, 146). Another result of the commission form of government 
was the increasing presence of businessmen and business interests (Schiesl 1977, 
Weinstein 1962). The consequence of this was policies which favored middle and 
upper class values (Judd and Swanstrom 2004, Schiesl 1977, Welch and Bledsoe 
1988).  
15 
 
Opportunely, Richard S. Childs and the National Municipal League were equipped 
with a solution. Their answer was a new form of government which remedied the 
problem of commission government by placing a city manager at the helm of the 
administrative needs of the council. Staunton, Virginia was the first locale to hire a 
city manager in 1908. However, Sumter, South Carolina was the first city to adopt the 
full platform in 1912. The full platform required alteration to the city charter. Staunton 
adopted it in 1920 (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Schiesl 1977). Dayton, Ohio followed 
suit in 1913 and ten years later the system was in pace in 270 cities. As of 2006, the 
International City/County Management Association states this to be the most common 
form of government with 55 percent of American municipalities using it (National 
Civic League 2009, National League of Cities 2013).  
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REFORM CITIES: Implementation and Effects  
The most common implementation of the city manager platform, or Council-Manager 
form of government, involves charter reform which was codified in the National 
Municipal League’s second edition of the Model City Charter in 1915. The most 
recent version, the Eighth Edition, was released in 2003.  Presently, municipal 
government is described as being reform or non-form, or administrative or political. 
Reform, or administrative, municipalities often include the council-manager form of 
government, nonpartisan elections, and at-large elections. Non-reform or political 
governments consist of a strong, directly elected mayor, partisan elections, and ward 
elections (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Morgan, et al., 2007).  
Clearly, the primary goals of the reformers were to end corruption in municipal 
government. However, the normative goals also included making the government 
more accessible and responsible “to the people.” Reformers viewed machines as 
barriers to participation because of national and state influence on local elections, 
patronage, and generally corruption elections (Banfield and Wilson 1963, Hawley 
1973, Lee 1960, Wood 1958). Therefore, removing these barriers, it would be easier 
for citizens to become informed and make rational electoral decisions. By making 
these informed and rational decisions, they would see the fruit of their labor and 
political and civic engagement would take hold (Gates 1999, Keller 2002, McGrath 
2011, National Civic Review 1994). Instead, the reformers removed one set of barriers 
only to put others in place. In this next section, I will review the extant literature on 
the effects of nonpartisanship, council-manager structure, and at-large elections on 
voter participation. The important point here is that while most political scientists 
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believe that high levels of participation are required in order for there to be responsive 
executives and legislatures (Lijphart 1997, S. M. Lipset 1963, Lipset and Schneider 
1983), the evidence is that these reforms produced the opposite results.   
The A-Political Government 
Research on nonpartisan elections and turnout suggests that municipal reform 
depresses civic participation. To better understand the relationship between voters and 
participation, it is helpful and important to review the existing scholarship on the 
subject. The most basic and common way to explain why people do, or do not vote is 
through what was originally presented by Anthony Downs in 1957 as the “calculus of 
voting.” This calculus provides a simple cost/benefit analysis of the rationale people 
use for going to the polls. The basic equation states that the reward the voter receives 
from the act of voting is equal to a combination of both how much the voter prefers 
one candidate over another and the probability that candidate will win, minus the costs 
to the voter for this act. The costs involved include time and information which can be 
quite high. Based on this formula, the costs usually seem to outweigh the benefits for 
“rational” people. Thus, voting turnout can be understood to be low. Other scholars 
have sought to enhance the calculus by adding other factors which better represent the 
human and social qualities involved in the act of participation, such as benefits which 
include a sense of fulfillment from exercising a civic duty (Riker and Ordeshook 
1968). The significance of the calculus of voting here is that costs associated with 
voting, including the time is takes to register as well as the time and effort it takes to 
become informed on the issues and candidates and the time it takes to get to the 
polling place, can easily be too high for people to overcome.  
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Efforts to increase voter turnout and participation invariably include ways which aim 
to decrease the costs of voting. For example easing the registration process either by 
allowing people to register the same day as they vote or allowing people to vote by 
mail have been shown to do just that (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Highton 2004, 
Hill 2006). Another method voters use to decrease the transaction costs associated 
with voting is by employing “information shortcuts.” People use information shortcuts 
every day in their decision-making processes. It is costly to spend time gathering all 
the available information about any given decision, whether it be which car to 
purchase or which candidate to favor. Information shortcuts are informed by a variety 
of sources including friends and neighbors, the media, and opinion leaders (Popkin 
1995).  One particularly important shortcut, or heuristic, is political party. While 
political parties at the state and local levels can vary from the national parties on some 
messages and platforms, party labels can quickly help a voter decipher information 
about candidates (Conover and Feldman 1989). Party preference is likewise influenced 
by friends and neighbors, the media, and opinion leaders in addition to past events and 
current facts about a campaign or candidate (Popkin 1995).  
One of the arguments for reform was that by equalizing the ballot, by removing 
partisan labels, voters would take it upon themselves to become more informed in 
their decisions. What has been shown to happen, though, is that by removing this 
information shortcut the costs associated with voting increase. This increase in cost 
causes some voters to disengage and thereby lowers voter turnout and participation. 
Charles Adrian was one of the first to assess and critique the impact of nonpartisan 
municipal elections and point to this unfortunate consequence.  
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Adrian begins his 1952 paper by describing the context within which the reformers 
made their case for “a series of innovations designed to place government ‘on a 
business basis’ and to weaken the power of the political parties” (Adrian 1952, p. 
766). He describes eleven characteristics2 which he saw as the negative consequences 
and outcomes from the implementation of the specific reform of nonpartisan ballots 
and elections. Ultimately, he presents consequences which undermine some of the 
arguments reformers made in advocating such amendments. For example, rather than 
producing a more informed and energized citizenry which chooses the most qualified 
leaders for their community, Adrian points to the proliferation of incumbents and the 
lack of accountability for the elected officials.  
Adrian (1959) also categorized a typology including four generalized municipalities 
which vary by presence and/or strength of political parties and other groups in the 
community, either politically affiliated or not. Some communities have no semblance 
of political parties in their communities, whereas other communities have other groups 
which operate in very similar ways to parties but do not have a political label, per se. 
Specifically, Type I includes elections where candidates with the best chance of 
election are those which have partisan backing, despite the lack of party affiliation on 
the ballot. Type II includes elections where slating groups, partisan and nonpartisan, 
                                                             
2 The eleven characteristics are:  1. Nonpartisanship serves to weaken the political parties in those areas 
where it is in effect; 2. Segregation of political leaders strictly to either partisan or nonpartisan areas is 
the general rule; 3. Channels for recruitment of candidates for partisan offices are restricted by 
nonpartisanship; 4. Channels for recruitment of candidates for nonpartisan offices are restricted by 
nonpartisanship; 5. Limited new channels for recruitment of candidates for nonpartisan offices are 
opened by nonpartisanship; 6. Segregation of funds for financing nonpartisan and partisan election 
campaigns is nearly complete; 7. Facilities for fund-raising by candidates for nonpartisan offices are 
restricted by nonpartisanship; 8. Nonpartisanship encourages the avoidance of issues of policy in 
campaigns; 9. Nonpartisanship tends to frustrate protest voting; 10. Nonpartisanship produces a 
legislative body with a relatively high percentage of experienced members, making for conservatism; 
11. There is no collective responsibility in a nonpartisan body. 
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support various candidates. Type III includes elections where various slating groups 
support candidates, but there is little party involvement. Type IV includes elections 
where neither slating groups nor parties are active in campaigns, and if they are it is 
only sporadically. This study illustrates some of the ways communities and their 
leaders adapted to the structural absence of party labels. Adrian concludes by writing, 
“with a few exceptions, nonpartisan elections have accomplished what they were 
originally designed to do; they have effectively removed regular political machinery 
from involvement in certain kinds of local, judicial and state elections” (Adrian 1959, 
p. 458). 
Pomper (1966) studied the effect of other groups in nonpartisan municipal elections in 
Newark, New Jersey. The author surmises that Newark fits into Adrian’s third type of 
nonpartisan election. He found that where there are other groups – either religious or 
ethnic or racial – to be organized along such cleavages, they can and will do so. What 
is striking about this study, as well as some others from that time period, is that it 
speaks to the social aspect in communities as well as to the history and formation of 
parties in the U.S. (Freeman 1958, Salisbury and Black 1963, Hagensick 1964). The 
United States was conceived without parties, but they emerged out of necessity and 
out of the social beings that operated the government (Aldrich 1995). On one hand, 
this is a hydra-like problem for the reformers. By cutting off the name of the 
organizations or parties, people moved to organize in a similar way. On the other 
hand, once the organization and structure of parties or like-groups is gone it is hard to 
reconstruct (Karnig and Walter 1983, p. 503). 
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In his research on California city elections, Lee (1960) discusses the decrease in voter 
turnout in local elections from general elections. While his findings do support the 
consensus that local elections draw fewer voters to the polls, his findings do not point 
directly to nonpartisan ballots as the culprit.  Karnig and Walter, however, found that 
both nonpartisan ballots and city-manager structures impede voter turnout (Karnig and 
Walter 1983). Supporting Adrian and Pomper’s findings, Squire and Smith show that 
nonpartisan elections can easily be viewed as partisan or partisan-like in the minds of 
the electorate based on the information available to them (Squire and Smith 1988). 
More recently, Schaffner, Streb and White (2001) present further evidence that 
nonpartisan elections depress voter turnout and that voters use information based on 
incumbency rather than party, thus furthering incumbents careers. 
The Council-Manager Government 
The literature on the structure of local governments, namely the form of government, 
indicates that those with reform governments have lower voter participation in the 
form of voter turnout. The following section reviews the findings from relevant 
scholarship.  
In their 1968 article, Robert Alford and Eugene Lee examined turnout in American 
cities looking at the categories of “political structure, social structure, and community 
continuity” (Alford and Lee 1968, 800). Of interest for this study is their focus on 
political structure, namely form of government. The authors also included ballot type, 
partisan versus nonpartisan, in their calculation of structure. They found that reformed 
governments, those with the council-manager form of government and nonpartisan 
ballots, have lower voter turnout than those without reformed strcutures (Alford and 
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Lee 1968, 802). In attempting to assess the independent impact of form of government 
on turnout, the authors found it to be more significantly correlated with turnout than 
ballot type (partisan or nonpartisan) (Alford and Lee 1968, 805).  
As referenced above, Karnig and Walter examined the impact of structure on 
municipal turnout and found reformed governments, with city-manager forms and 
nonpartisan elections, to have lower turnout than non-reformed governments (Karnig 
and Walter 1983). The authors looked specifically at these two components of reform, 
city-manager and nonpartisan ballots, and used cross-sectional and longitudinal 
analysis of elections from the 1930s, 1960s, and 1970s.   Across these three time 
frames, the analysis shows council-manager governments lagging in turnout by about 
10 percent, as compared to commission and mayor-council forms (Karnig and Walter 
1983, 497).  
In 1997, Amy Bridges expanded the scope of study on the effects of progressive 
reforms by moving beyond the geographical areas previously studied. While some 
literature included analysis of region and geography, the south-western United States 
had not been extensively evaluated (Alford and Lee 1968, Karnig and Walter 1983, 
Lineberry and Fowler 1967). Bridges reviewed reform structures in seven southwest 
cities which implemented reform in the 1950s, comparing them to what she described 
as “machine descendent” cities from the Northeast and Midwest (Bridges 1997). Her 
findings show significant differences between municipal turnout with reform cities 
having roughly 20 percent average turnout and machine descendants having between 
43.6 percent and 57.3 percent (Bridges 1997, 101).  
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Concerned with a broader conception of voter participation, J. Eric Oliver studied the 
state of democracy in suburban areas (Oliver 2001). The author compared civic 
participation levels, including contacting local officials, attending community board 
meetings, participating in voluntary organizations, working informally with neighbors, 
and voting between reform and non-reform municipal governments. The only civic 
participation which was significantly different was voting, with non-reform 
governments showing a higher rate of participation (Oliver 2001, 183).   
Curtis Wood’s examination of turnout in city elections also supports the argument that 
form of government impacts turnout (C. Wood 2002). Using a random sample of 57 
cities, the author categorized cities based on their political or administrative structure. 
Wood employed five categories for structure, taking into account the varying types of 
government which have evolved over time. These categories include political, adapted 
political, conciliated, adapted administrative, and administrative. Controlling for 
socioeconomic factors and the timing of elections, Wood found that cities with more 
political structures, i.e. mayor-council and partisan ballots, have higher voter turnout 
than cities with more administrative structures, i.e. council-manager and nonpartisan 
ballots.  
Seeking further insight into voter turnout and municipal structures and potential 
remedies to lower participation rates, Hajnal and Lewis examined cities in California. 
While their key recommendation for tangible results to increase voter participation in 
municipal elections is to have local elections coincide with state and national 
elections, their findings provide more support for the argument that structure matters.  
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Specifically, they found that council-manager government structures dampen turnout 
(Hajnal and Lewis 2003, 658).  
Neal Caren sought to explain the variation in municipal turnout in cities by examining 
mayoral contests. Studying election data from 332 elections in 38 large U.S. cities 
over a 35 year period, the author employed a GLS random effects model and found 
more evidence to support the argument that the council-manager form of government 
is linked to lower turnout. Specifically, “cities with council managers have a turnout 
7.5 percentage points lower than cities with strong mayors” (Caren 2007, 41). In 
another model in the same study, the author looked at the interaction between the 
mayoral margin of victory and the form of government and found that even in 
competitive elections, there was lower turnout in cities with the council-manager form 
of government.   
Electoral Systems  
Another component of reform government is at-large or city-wide election of city 
councilors. Banfield and Wilson categorize the arrangements and procedures by which 
city officials are elected, at-large or district, as electoral systems (Banfield and Wilson 
1963, 87). While the bulk of the literature on the topic focuses on representation as 
opposed to turnout, it is important to understand the reformers’ arguments for this 
structural change and the potential effects of this reform. The following section will 
review the evolution of the electoral systems from district, or ward, to at-large and the 
scholarship on the effects.  
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Wards, or electoral districts within a city or municipality, were synonymous with the 
party boss and thus with corruption, graft, and greed in the same way partisanship was 
(Bridges 1997, Welch and Bledsoe 1988). Wards were also seen as bastions of the 
poor and immigrants classes which found representation through the ward system. So, 
it is not surprising that reformers moved to eliminate them soon after they argued for 
nonpartisanship. The reformers saw multiple reasons for moving to city-wide 
elections. It would weaken the power of the machine boss while encouraging those 
who ran to seek approval of the entire city. Like-wise, the reformers hoped this new 
method would produce the desired outcome of the election of “better people” (Judd 
and Swanstrom 2004, Morgan, England and Pelissero 2007, Welch and Bledsoe 
1988).   
The impact of the elimination of district electoral systems was clear, and in some 
places almost immediate. After the 1895 city council elections in Galveston, TX, the 
three African-American councilors lost their seats in the city-wide contest (Bridges 
1997, 74). Welch and Bledsoe found that at-large contests result in the election of 
better educated and wealthier councilors than those in district elections, holding other 
variables constant (Welch and Bledsoe 1988, 42). In sum, the move from district to at-
large elections appears to affect who is elected and tends to disadvantage minority 
populations.  
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IMPORT OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
The literature review up to this point has included discussion of political parties with 
regard to their presence or absence in local elections. The following section will 
review scholarship on the importance and utility of parties, both generally in American 
politics as well as specifically as they pertain to state and local political activity.  
Various scholars have cited the importance of political parties. The import and value 
they see ranges from the state and local to the federal and even to the normative 
underpinnings of how the American political system developed and functions. E. E. 
Schattschneider wrote in 1942 that, “the rise of political parties is undoubtedly one of 
the principal distinguishing marks of modern government...political parties created 
modern democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties” 
(Schattschneider 2009, 1). V. O. Key shows support for this view when he wrote that 
“political parties perform functions essential to the operation of a democratic order” 
(Key 1958, 311). Sarah McCally Morehouse makes a strong case for parties at the 
state level asserting that “the single most important factor in state politics is the 
political party.  It is not possible to understand the differences in the way sovereign 
states carry out the process of government without understanding the type of party 
whose representatives are making decisions that affect the health, education, and 
welfare of its citizens” (Morehouse 1981, 29).  
One way political parties demonstrate their utility is by solving the collect action 
problem. Collective action is the organized and planned behavior of and by individuals 
and groups. The problem of collective action occurs when individuals and groups 
work only in their self-interest and not with those who are like-minded. This can result 
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in the least optimal results for those involved. Aldrich provides an excellent example 
of a collective action problem which highlights the incentives for party formation. In 
his example, there are three legislators in a unicameral legislature encountering three 
bills which would provide distributive benefits. The benefits for any given bill would 
serve some districts more than others but cost all involved. Assuming each legislator is 
acting rationally, Legislator A would favor Bill X which most benefits his district, 
Legislator B would favor Bill Z which most benefits his district, and Legislator C 
would favor Bill Y most benefits his district. If each bill passes by a 2-1 vote, the total 
benefit or payoff to each legislator is negative. This is the least optimal outcome but 
one that is likely if the legislators act independently. The least optimal outcome is 
avoided and the problem of collective action is overcome when Legislators A and B 
agree to work together and vote only for Bill X. This rudimentary scenario shows the 
incentives for party formation.  
 Table 1. A Collective Action Problem and Incentive for Party Formation3 
 
This problem of collective action is manifested in the electorate when voters act as 
individuals with their own self-interest. For example, say there are three candidates 
                                                             
3 This table and example were adapted from Aldrich (1995, 30) 
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representing three diverse opinions on a salient issue. One supports eliminating roads 
altogether, one supports building new roads while neglecting those which are in need 
of repair, and a one supports fixing the roads in need of repair. Functional roads are a 
public good and one from which everyone benefits. If voters in this election are split 
between the candidate who wants to repair the existing roads and the candidate who 
wants to build new roads, the candidate who wants to abandon roads altogether could 
win; resulting in the least optimal outcome. Parties overcome this problem by 
aggregating the choices available so that the majority preference can win. Voter 
turnout is the “quintessential example” of the collective action problem with regard to 
the logic of voting (Aldrich 1995, 46). As Schattschneider stated, “Other things being 
equal, any unorganized group will exhibit a tendency toward dispersion of its voting 
strength which can only be overcome by planning, consultation, and organization” 
(Schattschneider 2009, 41-42).  
Parties help solve the collective action problem through such planning, consultation, 
and organization. As discussed above, the calculus of voting indicates that an 
individual’s perception of making a difference by voting can be low. Aldrich adds that 
the calculus of voting is preceded by a collective action problem of being informed 
(Aldrich 1995, 47).  Parties work to decrease the cost of voting by informing voters 
about the issue, particularly the importance of the outcome. Parties also work to 
mobilize the electorate by aggregating similar preferences amongst voters (Huckfeldt 
and Sprague 1992, 70). Lipset (2000, 48) stresses the importance of institutionalized 
party competition and therefore political parties through their role of “a social 
mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence 
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major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office” thereby solving 
the collective action problem.  
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DATA AND HYPOTHESES 
Based on the extant literature regarding voter participation in municipalities with 
reform governments and nonpartisan ballots, two hypotheses will be tested in this 
paper.   
H1: Municipalities with partisan ballots will have higher voter participation 
than those with no party identification. 
H2: Municipalities with Mayor-Council forms of government will have higher 
voter participation than those with other forms of government such as Council-
Manager, Administrator-Council, and Council.  
The data for this study measures voter registration and turnout from municipal 
elections between 2003 and 2012 in Rhode Island’s 39 municipalities.  There are five 
observations, or elections, for each municipality where available. There are only two 
observations for Providence because they hold their municipal elections every four 
years. There are only four observations for Central Falls because they did not hold 
elections in 20114. Due to the timing of some municipal elections, namely odd-year 
elections, the time span includes 2003 through 2012. By including multiple 
observations, it is possible to control for temporary spikes and dips in 
registration/turnout. It also guards against potential factors which might influence 
voter participation. A single observation might be constrained by other variables not 
measured in the study. And as previously mentioned, there are significant differences 
in voter participation in general and midterm elections. The data was compiled from 
                                                             
4 The City of Central Falls went into receivership in May 2011 and filed for bankruptcy in August 2011. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/us-rhodeisland-centralfalls-idUSTRE7703ID20110801  
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the Rhode Island Secretary of State, as well as individual municipal canvass or clerks’ 
offices by the author.  
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VARIABLES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The dependent variable of interest is voter participation. Voter participation is 
measured using two variables, voter turnout and voter registration. Voter registration 
(e.g. percent registered) is calculated as the number of individuals registered to vote 
over the total population of residents age 18 and over, for each municipality. This 
value represents those who are technically old enough to vote in each election. Voter 
age population (VAP) was chosen instead of voter eligible population (VEP)5 because 
information on voter eligibility by city was not available whereas basic population was 
available from the U.S. Census. VEP is more precise and includes an estimate of those 
within the population who are actually eligible to vote. For example, VEP takes into 
account non-citizens, felons, and other legally excluded sections of the population. 
While VEP may offer a more precise count, VAP was chosen because VEP is 
unfortunately unavailable. While VEP would be preferable, using VAP biases the 
models away from getting support for my hypotheses and therefore is acceptable.  
Population data, including total population and population over the age 18, is from the 
2000 and 2010 U.S. Census counts.  U.S. Census data from the 2000 count was used 
for observations which occurred in the years 2003 through 2005. For observations 
which occurred in the years 2006 through 2012, U.S. Census population data from the 
2010 count was employed. These two Census counts were used in an attempt to have a 
more accurate population count based on the timing of the observations. 
                                                             
5 For more information on VAP and VEP, visit Dr. Michael McDonald’s website on this topic, 
http://elections.gmu.edu/FAQ.html  
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Voter turnout is derived by dividing the number of individuals who did turn out to 
vote by the number of individuals who were registered to vote, for each municipality. 
Both turnout and registration data was obtained from the city or town clerk of the 
municipality’s canvass office.  
One issue with the data worth noting pertains to all observations for the town of New 
Shoreham. Using the above described method to derive voter registration, the resulting 
figures are more than one. This would mean there is more than 100% voter 
registration, which is not possible. There are three plausible potential explanations for 
this outcome. One is that the town officials have not cleaned their voter rolls, meaning 
they have old and inaccurate data. Another possibility is that the U.S. Census count for 
the town is not as current as the voter registration counts. For example, population 
data for the observation occurring in 2004 used U.S. Census data from the year 2000. 
Subsequent observations use population data from the 2010 U.S. Census. The third 
plausible reason is likely a combination of the two possible explanations just 
described. There is probably old and inaccurate data on the voter rolls in New 
Shoreham and there may be issues with the accurate population counts for the town.  
The data for New Shoreham was included in the models.  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
There are two primary independent variables of interest to this study. The first is a 
categorical variable which is defined by the presence or absent of party label on 
municipal ballots. This is a naturalistic observational study where the groups, 
nonpartisan and partisan, have already been assigned. Data on ballot type, partisan or 
nonpartisan, for each municipality was gathered from the Rhode Island Secretary of 
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State, as well as individual municipal canvass or clerks’ offices. In the data, partisan 
cities are coded as 1, and nonpartisan as 0.   
The second independent variable of interest is the form of government. There are four 
forms of municipal government in Rhode Island: Mayor-Council, Council-Manager, 
Administrator-Council, and Council (Rhode Island Department of Revenue Revised 
2013). Mayor-council governments are also referred to as political, as opposed to 
Commission or Council-Manager which are referred to as reform (Judd and 
Swanstrom 2004). Mayor-Council governments typically have directly elected 
executive and partisan elections. They also typically have ward elections as opposed to 
at-large, however there are a number of municipalities in Rhode Island which have a 
hybrid or both ward and at-large elections6. Council-Manager governments indirectly 
choose their executive, or manager, through the elected city council. They also tend to 
include other reforms measures such as elections separated from state and national 
elections, in addition to nonpartisan ballots and at-large elections. Rhode Island’s 
Administrator-Council governments are similar to Council-Manager in that they do 
not have a directly elected executive and may have nonpartisan ballots. Commission 
and Council governments have no specific executive and tend to incorporate reform 
measures. In Rhode Island, there are 16 municipalities with Council-Manager 
governments, 10 with Administrator-Council governments, 8 with Mayor-Council 
governments, and 5 with Council governments.  
For this analysis, Council-Manager and Administrator-Council were combined into 
one variable. Based on available information about the design and structure of the 
                                                             
6 Newport, RI is an example of a city employing hybrid ward and at-large elections. Of the seven city council seats, 
four are elected at-large and three are elected from individual wards. http://www.cityofnewport.com/government  
35 
 
cities and towns, these two forms of government are very similar. Since form of 
government is not the sole focus of this study and the differences in form for this 
setting are small, Council-Manager and Administrator-Council were combined into a 
single form in the analysis of form of government. In the regression model, Council 
form of government was dropped to serve as the comparison group for the other 
forms. Data on the form of government for each municipality was gathered from the 
Rhode Island Secretary of State, as well as individual municipal canvass or clerks’ 
offices.  
In Amy Bridges’ assessments of municipal reform in the Southwest, she terms chosen 
municipalities form the Northeast and Midwest as “machine descendants” (Bridges, 
Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest 1997). While in theory the 
municipalities which I am studying may fall into this categorization, I am reluctant to 
state that they are due to a lack of specific empirical definitions. Bridges’ definition 
states that “Machine descendants all had strong party organizations, substantial 
patronage resources, and concurrent elections. Another difference between big-city 
reform and the machine descendants is that all of the big-city reform cities had 
citywide elections for the city council members and machine descendants had district 
representation on the city council” (Bridges 1997, 131).  Without specific criteria for 
what constitutes strong party organizations or significant patronage resources or a 
timeframe for when concurrent elections began or ceased, I cannot confirm that any of 
the cities and towns in Rhode Island qualify.  
The final variable employed and tested is one which combines the absence of party 
label, or nonpartisanship, and presence of the Council-Manager and Administrator-
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Council form of government. In the data, municipalities with both nonpartisan ballots 
and the Council-Manager and Administrator-Council forms of government are coded 
1, and those which do not have this combination as 0.  Alford and Lee (1968), Karnig 
and Walter (1983), and Wood (2002) each included a similar variable in their analyses 
and found mayor-council and partisan ballots, have higher voter turnout than cities 
with council-manager and nonpartisan ballots.  
Control Categorical Variables  
There are a number of other control variables which are included in this analysis. 
Because there are many factors which can influence voter participation, it is important 
to include those which are relevant. Of course, all potentially influential variables 
cannot and are not included; however, I have tried to control for the major known 
predictors of voter turnout. Those which pertain to this study are discussed below.  
Another variable which relates to the structural reforms discussed above, such as the 
form of government, is the timing of elections. For the most part, municipal elections 
in Rhode Island are held during even years, coinciding with national and state 
elections in November. However, some are held during odd-years and/or during times 
of year that are not generally associated with other elections. There is considerable 
extant literature and historical evidence which shows voter participation is higher in 
years with national, Presidential elections than those in which midterm, state-wide 
elections occur (Burden 2000, Campbell 60, Conway 1981, Gilliam 1985, Shields & 
Goidel 1997, Wolfinger, et al. 1981). Similarly, there is evidence which shows that 
elections which take place during odd-years have lower turnout and participation than 
those in midterm years (Hajnal & Lewis 2003, Wood 2002). To take into account the 
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variation in timing, each municipal observation was coded to correspond with when 
the election occurred and included General Election, Mid-Term Election, Odd-Year 
Election, or Other Time (e.g. non-second Tuesday in November election). Information 
on when each municipal election occurred was gathered from a few different sources. 
For those elections which occurred in even years, both Presidential and mid-term 
election years, the information was readily available online at the state Board of 
Elections website. For those municipalities which held elections either during odd-
years and/or at different times of year, the respective town clerk or canvass office was 
contacted to verify when the election was held.  
How competitive an election is may have an impact on turnout. The more interesting, 
exciting or talked about an election is may compel those who might ordinarily sit out 
an election to pay attention and cast a ballot. Similarly, if an election is perceived to be 
close, the idea that one’s vote will matter increases (Conway 1981, Wood 2002,  
Hajnal & Lewis 2003). To account for any potential influence from close or 
competitive elections, a variable to represent electoral competition was derived and 
employed. To capture overall electoral competition for each municipality in a given 
election, the percent was taken using the number of challengers divided by the total 
number of council seats. For example, if there were 5 seats on a council and 7 
challengers for the open seats that election, the electoral competition value would be 
7/5 or 1.4. An overall competition value was chosen as there is variance in the 
construct of each municipality’s city or town council. In some, all councilors are 
elected at-large, in others all are elected from wards, and others still have a mix of 
ward and at-large representation. This competition value takes into account the 
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number of seats, the number of challengers, and allows for there to be one value per 
municipality for each observed election.  
Socioeconomic and demographic factors are correlated with participation7.  It has been 
clearly, significantly and robustly documented that “citizens with higher social and 
economic status participate more in politics” (Conway, 1985, p. 125, Verba and Nie 
1972, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). To ensure that demographic differences 
across the municipalities were controlled, the following variables were included as 
percents of the population: marital status, households with children under the age of 
18, educational attainment (measured as having completed high school), educational 
attainment with some college, race and ethnicity, foreign born, language other than 
English, and median household income. Data for each municipality was obtained from 
U.S. Census data from the official 2000 and 2010 counts and from existing and 
requested documents from the Division of Planning in Rhode Island’s Department of 
Administration (State of Rhode Island Division of Planning 2012). U.S. Census data 
from the 2000 count was used for observations which occurred in the years 2003 
through 2005. For observations which occurred in the years 2006 through 2012, U.S. 
Census population data from the 2010 count was employed. These two Census counts 
were used in an attempt to have a more accurate count based on the timing of the 
observations.  
The Division of Planning’s website provides spreadsheets containing municipal level 
socioeconomic data on age, race, and ethnicity, using data from the 2010 U.S. Census 
and the American Community Survey (ACS). A spreadsheet containing the median 
                                                             
7 For more on this topic, please see the literature review section on participation. 
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household income for each municipality was sourced from the Census’ 2007-2011 5-
Year ACS. In order to get the social characteristics for each municipality, I requested 
the data from the Division of Planning. It was provided and is sourced from the 2007-
2011 5-Year ACS (Martin 2012). The data for social characteristics for observations 
which occurred in the years 2003 through 2005 was obtained from the 2000 U.S. 
Census report. The ACS data was used with social characteristics for observations 
which occurred in the years 2005 through 2012. Each of these factors should be 
associated with higher voter turnout. 
Due to the variation across municipalities in size and demographics, percentages were 
used to represent marital status, the number of households with children under age 18, 
educational attainment, and race and ethnicity using the municipality’s population as 
the denominator. Race and ethnicity included percentages of White, Black, Asian, and 
other. Other was an aggregate of the remaining races and ethnicities provided by the 
Census.  
It is important to note that the ACS data comes from a survey and the values for each 
municipality are estimates. These estimates can have varying margins of error, 
depending on the data set. The margins of error can be larger for smaller geographic 
areas. The relationship between socioeconomic and demographic variables and voter 
participation is not the focus of this study yet they are important to take into account. 
The ACS data was used because it is the best and most reliable available data. 
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METHODOLOGY 
A random effects generalized least squares regression with robust standard error 
adjusted for clustering of municipalities over time was employed. A total of four 
models are run. They include a registration model and a turnout model for ballot type 
and form of government and a registration model and a turnout model for the 
combined variable of nonpartisan ballot type and council-manager and administrator-
council forms of government. All four models were run in STATA using xtreg and the 
syntax code used for each is available in Appendix II. 
The interclass correlation (rho) for the two turnout models are .14 and .23, 
respectively. The interclass correlation (rho) for the two registration models are both 
.93. The tables for each model are presented in the following results section.  
Statistical Model 
A total of four models are run. While the dependent variables change with each model, 
the control variables in each include the percent estimated married, the percent of 
households with children under the age of 18, the percent with educational attainment 
through high school, the percent with educational attainment of some college, the 
percent foreign born, the percent with a language other than English, median 
household income, percent race white, percent race black, percent race other, percent 
race other, the variable for electoral competition, the time of election in midterm 
years, the time of election in off-years, and the time of election in other times with the 
time of election in general elections held constant.  
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FINDINGS 
The following section reviews the findings and results. Bivariate analyses of the 
hypotheses are discussed, followed by findings in the random effects generalized least 
squares regressions.  
Statewide Registration and Turnout 
 Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 shows the average registration and turnout statewide for each observation. 
After a slight dip in the second observation period, registration appears to be 
increasing slightly over time. Turnout appears to be higher in the first, third and fifth 
observations, which corresponds to presidential election years. There is a slight drop 
in turnout in the second observation and a marked decreased in turnout in the fourth 
observation.  
Partisanship  
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Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 shows the comparison of average registration in municipalities with partisan 
ballots to those with nonpartisan ballots. Average registration for partisan 
municipalities over the five observations was 76.45%. The bivariate analysis in Figure 
2 supports my hypothesis. Average registration is higher in partisan cities than in non-
partisan cities.   
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Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 shows the comparison of average turnout in municipalities with partisan 
ballots to those with nonpartisan ballots. Average turnout for partisan municipalities 
over the five observations was 61.88%. Average turnout for nonpartisan municipalities 
over the five observations was 56.7%. Municipalities with partisan elections show a 
higher rate of registration, 10.81%, and a higher rate of voter turnout, 5.18%. This is 
consistent with the existing research comparing the two types of elections and 
provides some support for the hypothesis that municipalities with partisan ballots will 
have higher voter participation than those with no party identification. And again, the 
bivariate relationships suggest support for my hypothesis. 
Form of Government 
Figure 4 shows the comparison of average registration in municipalities with Council-
Manager and Administrator-Council, Mayor-Council, and Council forms of 
government. Average registration for municipalities with Council-Manager and 
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Administrator-Council over the five observations was 76.46%. Average turnout for 
municipalities with Council-Manager and Administrator-Council over the five 
observations was 61.54%. 
 Figure 4. 
 
Average registration for municipalities with Mayor-Council governments over the five 
observations was 62.21%. Average turnout for municipalities with Mayor-Council 
governments over the five observations was 52.65%. This does not provide support for 
the second hypothesis.   
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Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5 shows the comparison of average turnout in municipalities with Council-
Manager and Administrator-Council, Mayor-Council, and Council forms of 
government. Average registration for municipalities with Council governments over 
the five observations was 77.82%. Average turnout for municipalities with Council 
governments over the five observations was 67.76%. 
Comparing the three forms of government shows Mayor-Council governments had the 
lowest registration and turnout, which is counter to the existing literature on the 
subject and to my hypothesis. On average, the Council form of government had the 
highest rates of registration and turnout, with Council-Manager and Administrator-
Council governments having registration and turnout rates between Mayor-Council 
and Council forms. This analysis does not support the hypothesis that municipalities 
with Mayor-Council forms of government will have higher voter participation than 
those with other, reformed forms of government such as Council-Manager, 
Administrator-Council, and Council despite the literature to date.  
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Figure 6 shows the comparison of average registration in municipalities with partisan 
ballots and either the Mayor-Council or Council form of government to those with 
both nonpartisan ballots and Council-Manager and Administrator-Council forms of 
government, or Reform Cities. Over the five observations, average registration for 
Reform Cities was 70.80% and for municipalities using partisan ballots and other 
forms of government was 74.54%. The bivariate analysis in Figure 6 supports the 
assertion that Reform Cities have lower participation, here specifically registration.  
 Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 7 shows the comparison of average turnout in municipalities with partisan 
ballots and either the Mayor-Council or Council form of government to Reform Cities. 
Over the five observations, average turnout for Reform Cities was 62.62% and for 
municipalities using partisan ballots and other forms of government was 60.32%. The 
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bivariate analysis in Figure 7 does not support the previous literature on the subject or 
the expectation that Reform Cities have lower turnout.  
 Figure 7.  
 
Such bivariate results might be due to a number of factors, such as the timing of the 
elections or socioeconomic variance. To address this possibility, random effects 
generalized least squares regressions with robust standard error adjusted for clustering 
of muni over time were employed. 
In the following section, I present the random effects generalized least squares 
regressions. As previously mentioned, the model allows for the comparison of 
different population groups at specific points in time. It also allows for the comparison 
of many variables at the same time, including those which are time-varying and time-
invariant. A random effects model was included as it is assumed that the differences 
among the variables are not correlated with the independent variables.  
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RESULTS 
The multivariate results presented in Table 2 do not provide statistically significant 
support for either of the stated hypotheses. The coefficient for the partisanship variable 
is positive but small and misses the threshold for statistical significance. Likewise, the 
coefficient for Mayor-Council municipalities is positive, but only slightly larger than 
that for Council-Manager and Administrator-Council. They also fail to make the 
threshold for statistical significance.  
Table 2. The Effect of Partisan Ballot Type and Form of Government on Voter Registration 
Registration  Coef. 
Robust 
Standard 
Error z P>|z| 
Estimate Married  -0.146238 1.072094 -0.14 0.892 
Households with Children under 18 -3.011378 2.395015 -1.26 0.209 
Educational Attainment, High School 0.5626477 0.8155703 0.69 0.49 
Educational Attainment, Some College 0.2682638 0.4365874 0.61 0.539 
Foreign Born -1.005284 0.5860992 -1.72 0.086 
Language other than English 1.179292 0.3779456 3.12 0.002 
Median Household Income 7.43E-06 4.56E-06 1.63 0.104 
Race, White  1.093647 0.6402177 1.71 0.088 
Race, Black 1.009261 0.8622962 1.17 0.242 
Race, Asian 0.307178 1.016278 0.3 0.762 
Race, Other 0.0833729 0.212934 0.39 0.695 
Electoral Competition -0.0068741 0.0068177 -1.01 0.313 
Partisanship 0.0498962 0.0305744 1.63 0.103 
Mayor-Council 0.1336262 0.0867573 1.54 0.124 
Council-Manager/Administrator-Council 0.1172696 0.0767221 1.53 0.126 
Time of Election, Midterm -0.0132557 0.0039352 -3.37 0.001 
Time of Election, Off-year 0.0469643 0.0827976 0.57 0.571 
Time of Election, Other -0.1170899 0.0675725 -1.73 0.083 
Year 0.0052592 0.0016729 3.14 0.002 
constant -11.33574 3.666669 -3.09 0.002 
number of observations = 190         
sigma_u 0.12752115       
sigma_e 0.03490005       
rho 0.93031824 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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Table 3 replicates the model from Table 1, but substitutes turnout as the dependent 
variable. The results presented in Table 3 provide mixed results. The coefficient for 
the Partisanship variable is statistically significant at the .05 level but is negative, 
meaning that municipalities with partisan ballots, when controlling for all other factors 
in the model, turnout at a lower rate than those with nonpartisan ballots. This does not 
support the first hypothesis or the literature on this topic. The coefficient for the 
Mayor-Council variable is also statistically significant at the .05 level and negative, 
meaning municipalities with that form of government turnout at a lower rate than the 
control. The coefficient for the Council-Manager and Administrator-Council variable 
is the strongest statistically at the .05 level and is negative, which supports the second 
hypothesis and the literature. Turnout in those municipalities occurs at a rate 4.3% 
lower than the control.  
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Table 3. The Effect of Partisan Ballot Type and Form of Government on Voter Turnout 
 
Turnout Coef. 
Robust 
Standard Error z P>|z| 
Estimate Married  -0.367989 0.3708347 -0.99 0.321 
Households with Children under 18 0.2591412 0.2436233 1.06 0.287 
Educational Attainment, High School 0.2311904 0.189778 1.22 0.223 
Educational Attainment, Some College -0.119606 0.353258 -0.34 0.735 
Foreign Born 1.116617 0.3773261 2.96 0.003 
Language other than English -0.8511025 0.1968368 -4.32 0.000 
Median Household Income 1.89E-06 7.53E-07 2.50 0.012 
Race, White  -0.6287977 0.2730819 -2.30 0.021 
Race, Black -1.018661 0.3549362 -2.87 0.004 
Race, Asian -0.1184795 0.5273183 -0.22 0.822 
Race, Other -0.616103 0.3153377 -1.95 0.051 
Electoral Competition 0.0017943 0.0062345 0.29 0.773 
Partisanship -0.0313629 0.0128258 -2.45 0.014 
Mayor-Council -0.0342494 0.016769 -2.04 0.041 
Council-Manager/Administrator-Council -0.0427629 0.0140298 -3.05 0.002 
Time of Election, Midterm -0.1091265 0.0046639 -23.40 0.000 
Time of Election, Off-year -0.3394152 0.0333321 -10.18 0.000 
Time of Election, Other -0.2326071 0.0213237 -10.91 0.000 
Year -0.0087376 0.0012935 -6.75 0.000 
constant 18.79599 2.676731 7.02 0.000 
number of observations = 190         
sigma_u 0.01618556       
sigma_e 0.0405743       
rho 0.13728432 
 
  
 
Table 4 replicates the model from Table 2, but substitutes the variable for the 
combination of nonpartisan ballot and Council-Manager and Administrator-Council 
form of government, or Reform Cities, for Partisanship and other forms of 
government. The results presented in Table 4 are consistent with expectations.  Alford 
and Lee (1968) and Wood (2002) both employed a similar variable in their analyses 
and found the combination of nonpartisan ballots and the Council-Manager form of 
government to correlate with lower turnout. Their analyses, however, only looked at 
turnout and not registration.  
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The variable representing the combination of ballot type and form of government is 
statistically significant at the .05 level and negative, meaning that municipalities which 
have both nonpartisan ballot and the Council-Manager or Administrator-Council 
forms of government register to vote at a lower rate 3 than those with partisan ballots 
and reform governments.  
Table 4. The Effect of the Combination of Nonpartisan Ballot Type and Council-
Manager and Administrator-Manager Form of Government on Voter Registration 
Registration Coef. 
Robust Standard 
Error z P>|z| 
Estimate Married  -0.0430687 1.078428 
-
0.04 0.968 
Households with Children under 18 -2.933284 2.422218 
-
1.21 0.226 
Educational Attainment, High School 0.3846304 0.7844328 0.49 0.624 
Educational Attainment, Some College 0.2485502 0.4153187 0.60 0.550 
Foreign Born -0.90977 0.5350147 
-
1.70 0.089 
Language other than English 1.1627 0.3608438 3.22 0.001 
Median Household Income 5.88E-06 4.17E-06 1.41 0.158 
Race, White  1.279994 0.6384716 2.00 0.045 
Race, Black 1.258597 0.8731887 1.44 0.149 
Race, Asian 0.8597684 1.021757 0.84 0.400 
Race, Other 0.052426 0.2075007 0.25 0.801 
Electoral Competition -0.0063387 0.0066906 
-
0.95 0.343 
Nonpartisan and Council-
Manager/Administrator-Council -0.0348704 0.0143088 
-
2.44 0.015 
Time of Election, Midterm -0.0140247 0.0039465 
-
3.55 0.000 
Time of Election, Off-year 0.0241695 0.0938023 0.26 0.797 
Time of Election, Other -0.1283271 0.0813067 
-
1.58 0.114 
Year 0.005144 0.0016632 3.09 0.002 
constant -11.03101 3.649263 
-
3.02 0.003 
number of observations = 190         
sigma_u 0.12567938       
sigma_e 0.03494568       
rho 0.92823437 
 
  
 
Table 5 replicates the model from Table 4, but turnout is substituted as the dependent 
variable. The results are counter to expectations and the existing literature. The 
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coefficient for the combination variable just misses the threshold for statistical 
significance but is positive, meaning that Reform Cities tend turnout to vote at a 
higher rate than those with partisan ballots and other forms of government.  
Table 5. The Effect of the Combination of Nonpartisan Ballot Type and Council-Manager 
and Administrator-Manager Form of Government on Voter Turnout 
Turnout Coef. 
Robust Standard 
Error z P>|z| 
Estimate Married  -0.3428449 0.4126972 -0.83 0.406 
Households with Children under 18 0.2068572 0.3182104 0.65 0.516 
Educational Attainment, High School 0.3409729 0.2275487 1.50 0.134 
Educational Attainment, Some College 0.0021901 0.3712666 0.01 0.995 
Foreign Born 0.7998716 0.4261308 1.88 0.061 
Language other than English -0.6723239 0.2430414 -2.77 0.006 
Median Household Income 2.57E-06 7.61E-07 3.38 0.001 
Race, White  -0.7441727 0.2690658 -2.77 0.006 
Race, Black -1.07179 0.357863 -2.99 0.003 
Race, Asian -0.3100743 0.4906737 -0.63 0.527 
Race, Other -0.5506856 0.2868441 -1.92 0.055 
Electoral Competition -0.0016322 0.0062309 -0.26 0.793 
Nonpartisan and Council-
Manager/Administrator-Council 0.0234148 0.0131286 1.78 0.075 
Time of Election, Midterm -0.1079845 0.0045965 
-
23.49 0.000 
Time of Election, Off-year -0.3220109 0.0400441 -8.04 0.000 
Time of Election, Other -0.2387725 0.0302406 -7.90 0.000 
Year -0.0086333 0.0013146 -6.57 0.000 
constant 18.55303 2.725177 6.81 0.000 
number of observations = 190         
sigma_u 0.02217715       
sigma_e 0.04060758       
rho 0.22973916 
 
  
 
In both models where turnout is the dependent variable, each variable for the time of 
election is statistically significant with negative coefficients. Table 3 shows midterm 
elections to have turnout at a rate 10.9% lower than elections which occur during 
Presidential election years, or general elections. Off-year elections have a turnout rate 
33.9% lower than general election years Elections which take place at other times 
during the year other than the traditional first Tuesday in November have turnout rates 
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23.3% lower than general elections. Table 5 shows similar results. Municipalities 
which have nonpartisan ballots, the Council-Manager or Administrator-Council form 
of government, and have elections during midterm year have a predicted turnout rate 
10.8% lower than those which have partisan ballots, other forms of government and 
elections timed with Presidential general elections. Elections held during off years 
have a predicted 32.2% lower turnout rate and those timed at another time in the year 
have a predicted 23.88% lower rate of turnout than elections held concurrent with 
general elections.  
Taken together, the bivariate and multivariate analyses offer a mixed bag with regard 
to support for either hypothesis. While the bivariate analysis of turnout and 
registration between partisan and nonpartisan ballots supports the first hypothesis, the 
multivariate analyses for registration finds some support but the multivariate analysis 
for turnout yields contradictory statistically significant results. Similarly, the second 
hypothesis concerning form of government does not find support in the bivariate 
analysis but finds some support in the multivariate analyses.  
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DISCUSSION 
This analysis of municipal elections has produced a range of results, some of which 
seem contradictory. The following discussion will review the major findings, how they 
pertain to the stated hypotheses and questions posed at the beginning of the paper, and 
offer explanation for some of the apparent inconsistencies in the findings.  
The existing literature on the effects of ballot type, form of government, and 
combinations of the two, on voter participation uses voter turnout as the dependent 
variable representing participation. This study looks at two forms of participation, 
voter registration and voter turnout. Because voting is contingent on registration, it is 
logical that each represent participation. Likewise, it is logical that there would be 
differences between registration and turnout because they are two specific and distinct 
actions8.  
Major Findings  
The first hypothesis, testing the relationship between nonpartisan municipal ballots 
and voter participation, found support in the initial bivariate analysis which shows that 
municipalities utilizing partisan ballots have higher rates of registration and turnout. 
The multivariate analysis of voter registration, while missing the threshold for 
statistical significance, shows additional meager support. The multivariate analysis of 
turnout, however, suggests that municipalities with partisan ballots turnout at rates 
lower that those with nonpartisan ballots. This is counter to the expectations and 
literature on this topic. Multiple studies examining the relationship between ballot type 
                                                             
8 This is true in Rhode Island which does not currently allow for same-day voter registration.  
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and turnout have found lower voter turnout in municipalities using nonpartisan ballots 
(Alford and Lee 1968, Hawley 1973, Karnig and Walter 1983, Schaffner, Streb and 
Wright 2001, C. Wood 2002).  
The second hypothesis, testing the relationship between forms of municipal 
government and voter participation, did not find support in the initial bivariate 
analysis. This analysis shows that, counter to expectations, municipalities with 
Council forms of government tend to have higher rates of registration than those with 
Council-Manager and Administrator-Council forms and markedly higher rates than 
those with Mayor-Council forms of government. Similarly, the bivariate analysis of 
turnout shows Council forms of government to have higher rates of turnout than the 
Council-Manager and Administrator-Council governments and that the latter forms 
have higher rates of turnout than the Mayor-Council municipalities. These results are 
counter to both expectations and extant literature on the topic. Multiple studies 
examining the relationship between forms of government and turnout have found 
municipalities which have a Council-Manager form of government tend to have lower 
turnout than those with the Mayor-Council form (Alford and Lee 1968, Karnig and 
Walter 1983, Bridges 1997, C. Wood 2002). 
Of the eight municipalities with the Mayor-Council form of government, three have 
significantly lower average turnout rates than any of the municipalities in the entire 
state. These include Central Falls, Providence, and Woonsocket with average turnout 
rates of 35.83%, 37.47%, and 27.57% respectively. Two of these municipalities, 
Central Falls and Woonsocket, also use hold elections during odd-years and use 
nonpartisan ballots.  
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Because there could be other factors influencing participation, multivariate analyses 
are pursued. The second hypothesis finds some support in these analyses, although 
both fall short of the threshold for statistical significance at the .01 level. Looking at 
registration, Mayor-Council governments have a slightly higher rate of registration 
than Council-Manager and Administrator-Council forms, and both Mayor-Council and 
the combined Council-Manager and Administrator-Council form have higher rates 
than the control, Council. This is in line with expectations.   
Looking at turnout, however, the results are somewhat puzzling. The coefficients for 
both the Mayor-Council and the combined Council-Manager and Administrator-
Council forms of government are negative and statistically significant, at the .05 level. 
This means that the control form of government, Council, has higher rates of turnout 
than the Mayor-Council and the combined Council-Manager and Administrator-
Council forms, which is counter to expectations and literature on this topic. The 
coefficient for Mayor-Council form of government is smaller than that for the 
combined Council-Manager and Administrator-Council form, which does support the 
second hypothesis.   
An obvious question here is why are the coefficients negative? The data for the 
Mayor-Council form of government contains three municipalities with very low 
turnout, as mentioned above. Three of those municipalities have elections which occur 
in off years. The coefficient for off year elections in this turnout analysis shows that 
turnout is 33.94% lower than turnout in even year general elections. Conversely, the 
constant in this Form of Government analysis is the Council form. All five 
municipalities which have a Council Form of Government use partisan ballots and 
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hold elections during general and midterm years. We know from the bivariate analysis 
that the average turnout rate for the Council form is 67.76% while it is 52.65% for the 
Mayor-Council form. Perhaps the difference in when elections are held, in addition to 
the ballot type and form of government is enough to produce these results.  
The data for the Council-Manager and Administrator-Council forms of government, 
however, does not have any immediately visible outliers. One municipality, 
Jamestown, has consistently lower turnout which is likely influenced by the timing of 
their elections but this is hardly enough to significantly impact the entire category. Of 
the 26 municipalities in this combined form of government, elections by and large take 
place during general and midterm election years. And though the coefficient in this 
analysis is negative, meaning that these municipalities turnout at rates lower than the 
Council form of government, the value is larger than the coefficient for the Mayor-
Council form of government which is in line with expectations and literature.  
The third area of analysis looks at participation and Reform Cities, those 
municipalities which have both nonpartisan ballots and either Council-Manager or 
Administrator-Council form of government. The expectation is that towns and cities 
with both of these reform elements will have lower registration and turnout than those 
municipalities which have partisan ballots and have either a Mayor-Council or Council 
form of government. The multivariate analysis for registration provides statistically 
significant support at the .05 level with a negative coefficient. However, the 
multivariate analysis for turnout produces a positive coefficient and but does not meet 
the threshold for statistical significance. This means that Reform Cities tend to turnout 
at a rate higher than municipalities using partisan ballots and which have either a 
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Mayor-Council or Council form of government. This is counter to the expectations 
and literature on this topic (Alford and Lee 1968, Karnig and Walter 1983, C. Wood 
2002). 
Similar to the multivariate analysis for the first hypothesis, comparing participation 
between municipalities using partisan and nonpartisan ballots, there appears to be a 
shift that occurs between registration and turnout. However, it is not immediately 
obvious what this shift is.  
The timing of elections is important. It appears to be the most influential of the 
structural reform variables tested in the analysis of voter turnout. In the multivariate 
analyses on turnout, elections not held during general election years are all statistically 
significant at the .001 level and have large negative coefficients. These findings are in 
line with expectations and extant literature on the topic (Alford and Lee 1968, Hajnal 
and Lewis 2003, Hawley 1973, C. Wood 2002).  
The multivariate analyses of all models run does not find statistically significant 
support for the Electoral Competition variable. This means that, per the construct of 
this variable, the relative number of open seats and challengers for any given contest 
does not appear to influence either registration or turnout.  
Practical Relevance  
The findings in these analyses provide further support for a number of assertions about 
voter turnout in municipal elections and offer additional information on registration. 
The bivariate analysis of the effect of ballot type on both voter registration and turnout 
supports the first hypothesis of this study, as well as the extant literature on the 
59 
 
subject. The findings show that at this basic level, there are higher levels of 
participation in municipalities which employ partisan ballots. The multivariate 
analysis of form of government and turnout support the second hypothesis of this 
study. The findings show that municipalities with Council-Manager or Administrator-
Council and Council forms of government have lower rates of participation than 
municipalities with a Mayor-Council form. The multivariate analysis of Reform Cities 
and registration show that municipalities with both elements of Progressive Era 
reform, Council-Manager or Administrator-Council forms of government and 
nonpartisan ballots, have lower rates of voter registration than other forms of 
government which use partisan ballots. This look at registration is a line of study 
which not been much discussed in the current literature. Lastly, the multivariate 
analyses of turnout provides further support that the timing is elections matter. The 
farther a local election is from general elections, the lower the turnout. Policy-wise, 
this has clear implications. Not only is it more economical for state and local 
governments to have elections for various offices occur at the same time, it is more 
economical for the voter.  
Limitations 
As in the case with any research or empirical study, there are limitations. One 
limitation of this study is both political and cultural. Rhode Island is, by and large, a 
one-party state. Though the governorship was been occupied by a Republican during 
most of the time this study covers, both houses of the state legislature have had 
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Democratic majorities since 19789. In June 2013, the voter registration by party was 
Republican 10.23%, Democrat 40.12%, Unaffiliated 49.46%, Moderate .19%. Though 
almost half of the population is not affiliated with a party, Democratic Party 
registration holds a significant lead. During the time covered in this study, 2003 
through 2012, the state elected Democrats to the U.S. House of Representatives each 
time. In the U.S. Senate, they elected one Democrat and one Republican10. Rhode 
Island has also cast its Electoral College votes for Democratic presidential contenders 
in twelve of the past fourteen contests. All of this is to say that there is a lack of strong 
competitive parties in the state. This lack of partisan competitive results in a lack of 
political innovation by the parties and a lack real alternatives for the electorate 
(Hawley 1973). This lack of competition may influence the political behavior of the 
electorate. V. O. Key notably articulated the matter of one-party states when he wrote, 
“Over the long run the have-nots lose in disorganized politics” (Key 1949, 307). 
Another limitation is geography. The data comes from the smallest state in the union, 
and one which is located well within a single region. While the similarities within and 
between the municipalities may decrease the overall variance in the data, the lack of 
variety may play an important and unmeasured role in the analyses.  
As previously mentioned in the Data and Methods section, the data for New Shoreham 
is problematic. It is impossible for a city or town to have over 100% registration. This 
is a problem one finds when collecting such data in any part of the United States. 
                                                             
9 The National Conference of State Legislatures provides historical data going back to 1978. 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx  
10 That Republican, Lincoln Chafee, went on to change his party affiliation twice. At the time of this 
writing, he is a Democrat and the Governor of Rhode Island. 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/lincoln-chafee-to-switch-parties-sources-say-91994.html  
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Although federal elections are regulated at the federal level, all elections are 
administrated at the local and county levels. This means there can be wide variations 
in the collection, filing, storing, cleaning, and saving of said data.  
One possible limitation of the statistical analysis is that the random effects generalized 
least squares model used only a random intercept which assumes that variance and 
covariance of the variables over time are equal. However the model used was shown 
to account for a substantial amount of clustering within communities which provides 
does provide robust test of model effects. A more precise estimate might be obtained 
using models with covariance structure which allow for variation over time.   
Further Research 
In keeping with the previous section on limitations, there are two areas for further 
research and study which would provide immeasurable assistance to the study of 
municipal elections and voting behavior. One possibility is the creation of a central 
database of municipal data. The lack of consistency in collection and storage of such 
data, as well as the difficulty in accessing the data create barriers. Luckily, Rhode 
Island’s electoral results are readily available on an easy to access website. The 
relatively low number of cities and towns made it feasible not only to collect the data 
but to contact local canvass offices for additional information when needed. However, 
it still took a significant amount of time to collect all of the necessary data. When I 
initially began research for this study, I was surprised to learn that there is not one 
readily accessible place which can definitely tell you how many municipalities in the 
United States use nonpartisan ballots, or specifically have a Council-Manager from of 
government. There are resources, such as the International City/County Management 
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Association (ICMA) which produces the Municipal Yearbook, but they rely on survey 
data. If there was a central database which housed municipal data, I would venture the 
number of studies would increase, thereby increasing understanding in a variety of 
topics which could have important policy implications.  
Another opportunity for further research would be to replicate this study in other 
states, even the entire remaining forty-nine. Replication of the study in other states 
would offer valuable scholarship on the topic. By increasing the number of locations 
studied, more would not only be known about those individual states, but more 
comparison and analysis between states could occur. Such an undertaking would, of 
course, be made much easier is a central database of easily accessible municipal data 
existed.  
  
63 
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to test the effect of two structural reforms on voter 
participation in municipal elections. The findings and analysis add to the current 
literature on the topics of urban reform and voter participation and also contribute to a 
greater understanding of municipal elections in Rhode Island. It marks the first study 
to evaluate ballot type and form of government over five electoral observations in an 
entire state and in Rhode Island.   
It is clear from this research that structure matters when it comes to voter participation 
in local elections. The kind of ballot, partisan or nonpartisan, the municipal form of 
government, and the timing of elections each impact the rates at which citizens 
register and turnout to vote. For policy makers with an interest in boosting voter 
participation at the local level, there are lessons in these findings.  
Earlier in 2014, I was asked to consult on the proposals for charter reform in the city 
of Newport, RI. Generally, they were interested in ways to increase civic engagement 
and voter participation. More specifically, they were evaluating a number of structural 
reforms including the way in which the mayor is elected, whether or not to change 
from a hybrid system of ward and at-large elections of councilors to all ward or all at-
large, and what the current form of government really means with regard to 
accountability and responsibility. Due to my work on this thesis, I was able to provide 
the charter reform committee with information about the current literature on the areas 
of interest which I have studied. I also offered ballot type, moving from nonpartisan to 
partisan, as another element to consider. Now that this study is completed, I can offer 
the committee research on these topics which was conducted on Rhode Island. The 
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findings go beyond a single state, however. The scope of this study allows the findings 
analysis to be used in future research on the topics covered.  
“About all that can be concluded about voting in state and local elections is that 
scholars have a wonderful opportunity to narrow our focus of ignorance” (Key 1958, 
614).  
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APPENDIX I 
Descriptive Statistics 
Municipalities in Rhode Island 
    Ballot Type    
    Partisan  30  
    Nonpartisan 9  
    Form of Government    
    Administrator-Council 10  
    Council  8  
    Council-Manager 16  
    Mayor-Council 5  
    Electoral System    
    At-Large 26  
    Ward 8  
    Hybrid 5  
    Council Terms    
    Two Years 32  
    Four Years 7  
                 
   Electoral Observations 
Timing of Elections 1  2 3 4 5 
General 36  - 36 - 36 
Mid-term -  36 - 36 - 
Off-year 2  2 3 3 2* 
Other 1  1 - - - 
 
*The missing municipality for this observation is Central Falls 
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APPENDIX II 
STATA Syntax Code 
The first model which tests registration against partisanship and form of government 
uses the following syntax:  
. xtreg Percent_Registration Percent_EstMarried Percent_TotHouseKidsUnd18 
Percent_EdAttHS Percent_EdAttSColl Percent_ForBorn Percent_LangOtherEng Med 
HHIncome Percent_RaceWhite Percent_RaceBlack Percent_RaceAsian Percent_RaceOth 
Challenger_ElectComp Partisanship  FoG_MC FoG_CMAC  ToE_MT ToE_OY To E_OX 
Year, cluster (Muni_Code) 
The second model, which tests turnout against partisanship and form of government 
uses the following syntax: 
. xtreg Percent_Turnout Percent_EstMarried Percent_TotHouseKidsUnd18 
Percent_EdAttHS Percent_EdAttSColl Percent_ForBorn Percent_LangOtherEng 
MedHHIncome Percent_RaceWhite Percent_RaceBlack Percent_RaceAsian Percent_RaceOth 
Challenger_ElectComp Partisanship  FoG_MC FoG_CMAC  ToE_MT ToE_OY ToE_OX  
Year, cluster (Muni_Code) 
The third model, which tests registration against the combined variable of 
Nonpartisanship and Reform Form of Government uses the following syntax: 
. xtreg Percent_Registration Percent_EstMarried Percent_TotHouseKidsUnd18 
Percent_EdAttHS Percent_EdAttSColl Percent_ForBorn Percent_LangOtherEng 
MedHHIncome Percent_RaceWhite Percent_RaceBlack Percent_RaceAsian Percent_RaceOth 
Challenger_ElectComp NP_And_CMAC  ToE_MT ToE_OY ToE_OX Year, cluster  
(Muni_Code) 
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The fourth model, which tests turnout against the combined variable of 
Nonpartisanship and Reform Form of Government uses the following syntax: 
. xtreg Percent_Turnout Percent_EstMarried Percent_TotHouseKidsUnd18 
Percent_EdAttHS Percent_EdAttSColl Percent_ForBorn Percent_LangOtherEng 
MedHHIncome Percent_RaceWhite Percent_RaceBlack Percent_RaceAsian Percent_RaceOth 
Challenger_ElectComp NP_And_CMAC  ToE_MT ToE_OY ToE_OX Year, cluster (Mun 
i_Code) 
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